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Boundary spanning in a for-profit research lab: An exploration of the interface between 





In innovative industries, private-sector companies increasingly are participants in open 
communities of science and technology. To participate in the system of exchange in such 
communities, firms often publicly disclose what would otherwise remain private discoveries. In a 
quantitative case study of one firm in the biopharmaceutical sector, we explore the consequences 
of scientific publication—an instance of public disclosure—for a core set of activities within the 
firm. Specifically, we link publications to human capital management practices, showing that 
scientists’ bonuses and the allocation of managerial attention are tied to individuals’ 
publications. Using a unique electronic mail dataset, we find that researchers within the firm who 
author publications are much better connected to external (to the company) members of the 
scientific community. This result directly links publishing to current understandings of 
absorptive capacity. In an unanticipated finding, however, our analysis raises the possibility that 
the company’s most prolific publishers begin to migrate to the periphery of the intra-firm social 
network, which may occur because these individuals’ strong external relationships induce them 
to reorient their focus to a community of scientists beyond the firm’s boundary.  2
I. Introduction 
A burgeoning literature investigates the porous boundary between universities and 
companies, especially those in science-based industries. This work has developed along two 
macroscopic streams. First, a number of studies examine the emergence of the university as an 
engine of entrepreneurship, singling out its role in spawning startup companies (e.g., Zucker and 
Darby, 1996; Shane and Stuart, 2001; DiGregorio and Shane, 2003), as well as the significant 
rise in faculty patenting rates and faculty engagement in other forms of technology transfer 
(Mowery et al., 2001; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003; Azoulay, 
Ding, and Stuart, 2007; Colyvas and Powell, 2007). A second body of work approaches the 
interface from the reverse direction; it evaluates the potential gains to for-profit firms for 
contributing to open Science, especially the role of academic publishing in the development of 
firms’ innovative capacity (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh, 2002; Stern, 2004; Murray, 2004; Lim, 2009).  
This literature is large, but distilled, much of it concerns the process of boundary 
spanning. On one side of the divide, entrepreneurial faculty members have ventured into the 
world of commerce by building relationships and reputations in industry. On the other side, 
company researchers and dealmakers have navigated the academic landscape, seeking access to 
the distributed knowledge base that resides within the community of scholars. The obstacles and 
incentives to traverse the university-industry “divide”, however, differ on the two sides. For 
university faculty, the literature has pondered the collision and potential reconciliations of 
traditional scientific norms and values with the exigencies of commercial science, most notably 
the need for formal intellectual property rights on research advances (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2001). In negotiating their roles in industry, academic scientists have grappled with the 
normative challenges of appropriating private returns to a supposedly public good—scientific 
knowledge—and the construction of role identities that can accommodate juxtapositions between 
open and commercial Science (Murray, 2010). By contrast, as firms have adopted publication   3
policies that result in private knowledge crossing into the public sphere, the questions they face 
surround the balance between the time and disclosure costs that are incurred when research staff 
publish their scientific findings, versus the potential benefits of open publication policies, 
including access to the informal networks of science (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996).     
In this paper, we place the spotlight on, or more precisely, inside, a life sciences firm 
(hereafter, “BTCO”). This particular company owes its existence to entrepreneurial boundary 
spanners; BTCO’s cofounders hailed from both academic and private sector backgrounds. Along 
with a group of other biotechnology industry pioneers, BTCO’s founding heralded the 
emergence of a new type of company with unusually permeable boundaries and the adoption of 
core organizational design elements that were modeled after universities. As we will show, 
BTCO possesses an impressive publication record commensurate with its deep-seated ties to the 
academy. Today, BTCO is a research-intensive organization employing many Ph.D. scientists; it 
has successfully recruited senior scientists from prominent university appointments; and the 
internal organization of research at the company mirrors a biology department’s structure. We 
therefore regard BTCO as a straddler: it is a for-profit company that mimics certain features of a 
university. Indeed, the integrative activities of this and similar organizations have been a central 
force in the erosion of the boundary between for-profit and open Science. 
The general concern of our paper is the relationship between publishing, the allocation of 
rewards within the company, and the structure of the communication network inside and beyond 
the borders of the organization. We ask two primary questions. First, at the researcher level, what 
are the effects of publishing on discretionary compensation? Or, put differently, does the firm 
pay scientists to contribute to open Science (cf. Stern, 2004)? Second, how does publishing 
influence the architecture of communication networks inside and beyond the boundaries of 
BTCO? To address these questions, we exploit a unique data archive that includes demographic, 
publication, and compensation information for all researchers in BTCO. In addition, although for 
a shorter duration of time that will only permit analysis in the cross section, BTCO has provided   4
daily downloads of all electronic mail for the members of its research division. These electronic 
correspondences enable us to observe the correlates of publishing on the shape of the within-firm 
network, as well as basic characteristics of the interaction patterns between members of BTCO’s 
research staff and scientists at universities. 
We emphasize three findings. First, BTCO does reward successful publishers. 
Regressions with person fixed effects show that publication success increases the bonuses that 
researchers’ receive in a given year. Next, we utilize email data to examine the networks of 
publishers relative to non-publishers. Using these data, we report three results: first, prolific 
publishers are the recipients of a greater number of the messages sent by their immediate 
supervisors. Thus, not only do they receive more remuneration, publishers attract greater shares 
of their managers’ attention than do non-publishers. Second, researchers who publish have 
significantly more correspondents in universities. Using email data, for the first time we are able 
to provide direct evidence that publishing correlates with a company’s access to the informal 
networks of the broader scientific community.  
The third finding, however, intimates a trade-off: there is a negative relationship between 
researchers’ publication counts and their centrality within the BTCO email network. This result 
was unanticipated. Given BTCO’s heritage and values, its pro-publication policy, and the 
apparent priorities for allocating managerial attention, we reasoned that researchers’ standing in 
the academic community would reach inside the company to order its internal status hierarchy. 
Although these considerations suggest that prolific publishers will be central in the company’s 
communication network, our findings imply an offsetting process: as boundary spanning 
researchers become increasingly embedded in the academic community, they may migrate to the 
periphery of the internal BTCO communication network. This result, we believe, raises a 
challenge for maximizing the benefits of boundary spanning: in a world of widely distributed 
scientific expertise, the individuals within an organization who are most well networked beyond 
its boundaries are precisely those people who would ideally occupy central positions within the   5
firm. Yet, it is these very same individuals who seem to shift the locus of their interaction 
towards communities beyond the boundaries of the firm. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the some of the literature on distributed 
knowledge production and absorptive capacity, and the implications they have for the 
motivations and consequences of open publication policies in the private sector. The third section 
develops three hypotheses. Section IV presents data sources and measures, followed by the 
findings in Section V. The final section concludes and discusses implications for future research. 
II. Publishing, Boundary Spanning, and Social Networks in the Private Sector 
Two related insights frame the literature on the publication strategies of private-sector 
organizations. First, in science- and technology-based industries, the knowledge base that is the 
foundation for innovation can be very broadly distributed—so much so that Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr (1996) conceptualize the locus of innovation as residing in networks, rather than 
within the boundaries of single organizations (or, for that matter, even single organizational 
forms). In contexts such as biopharmaceuticals, software development, medical devices, and 
microelectronics, innovation is a process of spotting and borrowing: actors must spot discoveries 
that are pertinent to them and then borrow these insights to seed their own, internal development 
efforts. The second idea is absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). To identify and 
assimilate externally developed ideas, organizations first need to create the capacity to absorb. 
This is accomplished by investing in basic research to cultivate scientific and engineering 
understandings, and by encouraging researchers within the organization to connect to ideas that 
are developed beyond it.  
These two considerations—the diversity of participants in the innovation ecosystem and 
the need for absorptive capacity—are major considerations in for-profit firms’ decisions to 
publish scientific findings. Moreover, their implications extend to the possible adoption of a set   6
of human resource practices to manage in-house researchers (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998), 
as well as to optimal structures of communication within and across a company’s boundaries.  
II.a The Locus of Innovation. In macro-level theories of innovation, scholars see science and 
technology as collective endeavors. Historical and evolutionary perspectives view innovation as a 
process in which new discoveries are improvements to, or novel combinations of, antecedent ones (e.g., 
Schumpeter, 1942; Basalla, 1988; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1994). Building on this understanding, 
those who study the sociology of technology employ the metaphor of a “seamless web” to describe the 
multiplex relationships among participants in the development of any technical field (Hughes, 1987; 
Pinch and Bijker, 1984). A hallmark of this work, and of historical and sociological characterizations of 
the innovation process in general, is its emphasis on the relational context in which innovation unfolds 
(Podolny and Stuart, 1995)—new discoveries are never regarded as de novo creations; even path-
breaking inventions emerge from antecedents that fall within the continuity of an interconnected set of 
ideas.  
The canvas painted in this broad-brushed work aligns with findings from analyses of the 
innovation process in contemporary science- and technology-based industries. For example, in a 
set of empirical papers, Zucker and her colleagues illustrate the dependence of companies in the 
biotechnology industry on the discoveries of scientists at universities and research institutes 
(Zucker and Darby, 1996; Liebsekind et al., 1996). In a case study that exploits bibliometric data, 
Liebsekind et al. (1996) demonstrate two biotechnology firms’ use of external social networks to 
source scientific discoveries through entry into multiple, collaborative research projects with 
academic scientists. These authors argue that companies in this science-based industry rely on 
external collaborators to efficiently “prospect” for external developments in an increasingly vast 
scientific landscape. In the context of a present-day industry, these authors demonstrate that 
organizational innovation is anything but self-contained; companies heavily rely on external 
collaborators to develop new technology.   7
Drawing us back to the macro consequences of actor-level efforts to build connections 
with other participants in a technical arena, Powell et al. (2005) illustrate the implications of 
diffuse expertise for the collaborative structure in the overall organizational field in 
biotechnology. They depict the evolution of the network among firms, universities, research 
institutes, and financiers, and the changing rules of attachment that appear to drive the structure 
of the field-wide network over time. These authors observe that in a growing set of technical and 
scientific fields, a central task for innovators and entrepreneurs is to devise a strategy for 
developing points of contact with the individuals and organizations that collectively architect a 
field of ideas (Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Audia and Rider, 2005). 
II.b Absorptive Capacity. In what is now one of the most familiar ideas in the literature on 
organizational learning, Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) argue that the background knowledge 
required for innovation is cumulative: new ideas are aptly assimilated only if foundational 
understandings are in place. For multiple reasons, possessing a thorough understanding of the 
state-of-the-art is necessary for innovation in many fields. First, background knowledge is a 
prerequisite for opportunity identification. Without detailed knowledge of a particular area, 
actors may not understand the significance of new opportunities in the area and may even lack 
the ability to formulate feasible questions to explore. Second, even if new opportunities were 
recognized, a lack of sufficient expertise effectively excludes the ability to exploit external 
developments to further internal innovation objectives.  
If we accept the premise that the development of knowledge is widely distributed in 
many current fields of scientific or technical endeavor, then absorptive capacity hinges on a 
means to reach beyond the boundary of an organization to screen, monitor, and assimilate 
external developments that are deemed relevant. For example, much like the studies set in the 
biotechnology industry, Cockburn and Henderson (1998) propose that ties to universities are an 
essential element of the R&D process in the pharmaceutical industry; they find that R&D 
productivity is correlated with having staff scientists who coauthor with university faculty. Lim   8
(2009) pushes the link between absorptive capacity and external relationships one-step further: in 
a study of the diffusion of copper interconnect technology among semiconductor producers, he 
describes absorptive capacity specifically in terms of connectedness. Lim argues that external 
connectedness itself determines absorptive capacity. Of course internal R&D remains important, 
but its function is largely to enhance a firm’s access to external knowledge sources.  
Organizations enact multiple, often concurrent and complementary strategies to achieve 
external connectivity in domains of distributed innovation. First, they enter myriad, formal 
collaborative agreements to exchange, license, or co-develop technologies (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; 
Stuart, 2000; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Katila and Mang, 2003), which may assemble into a 
dense alliance network within communities of innovators (Powell et al., 2005; Schilling and 
Phelps, 2007). Second, knowledge traverses organizational boundaries through employee 
mobility (e.g., Almeida, Dokko, and Rosenkopf, 2003; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003) and 
through organizational members’ participation in formal knowledge sharing venues, such as 
standard setting bodies and industry associations (Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George, 2001). A third 
avenue of interchange is through myriad, informal associations. These range from participation 
in open source communities to the cultivation of informal collaborative relationships between 
members of a focal company and other actors in the broader innovation arena.  
Our analysis explores the latter phenomena, which has largely eluded study because of 
the obvious challenge of systematically observing such interactions. We consider the 
multifaceted consequences of a private sector firm’s participation in open Science. Viewed 
narrowly, open publication is just a manifestation of a corporate policy to permit the selective 
disclosure of the firm’s research discoveries and, in instances of co-authorship with researchers 
from other organizations, it provides an incomplete snapshot of the scientific collaborations in 
which the company is embedded. (The observed network is incomplete because much of the 
non-contractual collaboration—perhaps even the significant majority—yields outputs other than 
published articles, such as simple idea exchange or the sharing of research materials.) However,   9
we believe that the consequences of open publication are considerably broader: echoing the 
findings of prior work, a company’s policy vis-à-vis publication may affect its ability to recruit 
and retain researchers, its decisions about the allocation of rewards, its capacity to foster a broad 
network of informal collaborators, and even the status ordering and social structure within the 
firm. We explore these implications in the following set of hypotheses.  
III. Hypotheses 
For some time, scholars struggled to understand what seemed a puzzling phenomenon—
given the costs, why do companies permit employees to publish and present scientific and 
technical findings in the venues of open Science? The costs of publication are borne in at least 
three forms. First, substantial expenses are incurred in the consumption of employee time to craft 
research results into publications and to shepherd articles through peer review. In fact, given the 
sizeable time costs of writing and revising research papers, BTCO’s current management has 
recently introduced policies to reduce the number of submissions to second- and third-tier 
academic journals.
1 Second, publication is disclosure. Although it is possible to time the 
submission of publications so that they do not interfere with patent filings, firms that publish 
unavoidably disclose a great deal of information about the focus of their research endeavors. 
Thus, because science is part of strategy in industries such as biomedicine, open publication is 
tantamount to a revelation of strategic intent. 
Third, publication contributes to the conversion of firm-specific human capital to its 
general form, which in turn may increase employee mobility and bargaining power. When firms 
permit researchers to publish, they not only endow specific individuals with the credit for their 
discoveries; they also divulge this information to the public. It then becomes possible for 
                                                        
1 BTCO management emphasized that they were not discouraging public disclosure of scientific findings. 
They continue to authorize conference submissions and to sanction presentations in a variety of venues, 
but they actively discourage the submission of these results to low quality journals. They simply perceive 
little value in the production of peripheral papers.    10
external parties to link a firm’s technical developments to the specific individuals who 
contributed most to its creation. Efforts by competitors to poach talent may be an inevitable 
result. 
What, then, are the compensatory benefits that offset these costs, and what do they imply 
for how the organization behaves? In our interviews at BTCO (the findings from which closely 
parallel those reported in Cockburn and Henderson (1998)), interviewees underscored two 
points. First, a permissive publication policy is an essential component of any strategy to recruit 
and retain the highest quality researchers, especially individuals who hold doctoral degrees. 
Second, our interviewees suggested that it is necessary to do more than just permit researchers to 
publish their work; employees of the firm also should be rewarded based on their standing in the 
larger scientific community.  
This brings us to a larger point, which is that the labor market for top caliber researchers 
itself contributes to the blurred boundary between academic and commercial science. Because 
private sector firms must compete with universities and research institutes for new hires, firms 
attempt to create a university-like milieu to cater to the preferences held by the researchers 
whom they endeavor to recruit. After years in graduate school and, in many cases, additional 
training as post-doctoral fellows, candidates for employment will have extensive exposure to the 
norms and reward system in open Science. This means that potential recruits for whom firms will 
compete may value publications as a core element of their professional identity. Moreover, they 
are likely to view publications as the currency of professional achievement, and may prefer 
employment systems in which internal rewards reflect the professional esteem accorded to 
publication.  
There is an additional benefit of tying compensation levels to publication outcomes. Not 
only may this be a matter of employee preference, but pegging rewards to publications 
potentially helps firms to resolve a perennial dilemma: how to evaluate and reward researchers   11
who work on very long-term and highly uncertain projects, the vast majority of which will fail to 
deliver revenues for the firm (and none will do so in the proximate future)? Under these 
circumstances, peer-reviewed publications provide a semi-objective method of evaluating 
performance to allocate discretionary compensation in a context in which the quality of research 
is difficult to assess, and effort is challenging to measure. We therefore hypothesize, 
 
H1: Within BTCO, researchers’ discretionary compensation will increase in their publication 
success. 
If encouraging publication is necessary to recruit talented scientists, success in this 
activity is an essential component of building organizational members’ external networks. In 
short, publications are the passkeys to the invisible colleges of the scientific community. When 
scientists publish important findings, they gain the visibility that leads to invitations to present 
their research at conferences and colloquia; they attract the interest of potential collaborators; 
they become nodes in discussion networks about new developments in their fields; and more 
generally, they establish the types of relationships that provide them access to the exchange of 
knowledge that constantly circulates in the networks of the profession. In the conventions of 
exchange in open Science, access to these networks both is contingent on contributing to the 
corpus of open science, and correlated with the importance of the contributions one makes.
2 At 
the individual researcher level, this implies that the extent of a scientist’s embeddedness in 
external scientific networks likely will depend on his or her level of publication. We hypothesize,  
                                                        
2 In addition to publications, BTCO has an express policy to share reagents with the external scientific 
community. The exchange of reagents and other research materials is another illustration of conformance 
to scientific norms that further contributes to the embedding of BTCO researchers in the broader research 
community. In addition to this indirect benefit, sharing reagents also enables BTCO to directly observe 
externally performed research that builds upon their proprietary materials, which is another low-cost 
mechanism to monitor new developments.   12
H2: Within BTCO, researchers who publish will occupy more central positions in informal 
scientific networks beyond the borders of the company. 
Extrapolating from the networks of individual organizational members to their 
implications for the innovative activities of the overall company, the firm’s incentive to adopt a 
pro-publication policy that furthers researchers’ connections in the external scientific community 
rests in the hope that these ties will contribute to the accumulation of the firm’s absorptive 
capacity. Of course, this is a quid pro quo in the decision to permit staff to publish—the 
organization itself ultimately hopes to benefit from the enhanced networks of its individual 
members. 
The literature on absorptive capacity underscores, though, that an organization’s ability to 
apply the knowledge of its staff toward further innovation depends on the patterns of 
communication and distribution of knowledge within the organization. Thus, there are internal, 
formal and informal organizational components to absorptive capacity: in science- and 
technology-based companies, investing in basic research is necessary, but it may be insufficient 
for persistent innovation. It also is important to develop informal and formal methods of 
knowledge transfer within the organization. 
For example, Sørensen and Stuart (2000) argue that when organizations age, they tend 
toward an increased rigidity and an ossification of communication patterns among positions and 
roles within the firm. As the aging process unfolds, divisions within the organization take root 
and gradually impede the maintenance of the broad networks that facilitate innovation. In part 
because of these divisions, the rate and quality of innovation tends to decline with organizational 
age. Mowery and Rosenberg (1991) also underscore the importance of internal communication. 
They observe that the objective of basic research often is not to produce a good per se; it is to 
create the understandings that lay the groundwork for subsequently developing the good. But 
because these foundational understandings often are exploited in areas of the organization other   13
than the one in which they were developed, these authors admonition that the company’s R&D 
may become “sterile and unproductive” when there are silos within basic research or between it 
and the rest of the firm. 
Because publishing embeds the firm’s researchers in external scientific networks, 
publishing scientists are in some sense at the boundary of the firm. Their focus is partly external, 
and the value they bring to the organization is enhanced when they build relationships in the 
broader research community. At the same time, the maximization of this value may well depend 
on the positions that externally networked scientists occupy in the communication flows within 
the organization (Allen, 1977; Katz, Tushman, and Allen, 1995; Hansen, 1999). The stronger and 
broader the networks that publishers have within the firm, the more the organization may benefit 
from their external ties. 
In addition to the fact that publishing scientists may possess knowledge and contacts that 
will be sought by other members of the organization, there is reason to anticipate that 
researchers’ standing in the broader scientific community will contour their social positions 
inside the firm. In general, the formation of a status hierarchy among any group of employees is 
likely to depend on demonstrations of competence in the dimensions of job performance that are 
most valued by coworkers (e.g., Podolny, 2005; Bothner and Godard, 2009). In the specific 
context of BTCO and companies similar to it, these organizations have been imprinted with the 
scientific values of their academic founders. Because these firms have cultures that embody 
many of the values of academic institutions, we anticipate an organic correlation between 
individuals’ positions in firms’ internal status hierarchy and their contributions to open Science, 
much as we would expect to observe in a university context, in which scholarly productivity 
gives shape to the local status hierarchy. Therefore, we anticipate that in a science-based firm in 
which staff implicitly values scientific achievement, the standing of organizational members in 
the broader scientific community partially molds the company’s internal status hierarchy. We 
hypothesize:   14
H3: Within BTCO, researchers with successful publication records will occupy central positions 
in the firm’s internal communication network. 
 IV. Data and Methods 
  a. Context. We set our quantitative case study in the biopharmaceutical industry. This 
industry has served as a fertile testing ground for much of the literature on the relationship 
between innovation and collaboration among individuals, organizations, and organizational 
forms. The company that we study, BTCO, is a first-generation biotechnology firm, founded 
more than 25 years ago. Since its inception, BTCO has continuously dedicated significant 
resources to in-house research, and today its research division employs hundreds of scientists. 
The mandate of the firm’s research group, which is organizationally separate from its 
development arm, is to conduct basic and applied research to identify molecules that supply the 
company’s drug development pipeline.   
In line with the firm’s historical origins and strong ties to the academic community, the 
internal organization of BTCO’s research division resembles a university biology department. 
Researchers are subdivided into groups that map to scientific specializations, such as 
immunology, neurobiology, molecular biology, and oncology. These groups are then further 
divided into the firm’s core organizational units, which are laboratories led by (and named after) 
individual scientists. Though we analyze different subsets of the data, the company provided 
current and some historical data on all members of the research division.  
b. Publications. BTCO scientists have published extensively—in recent years, the firm’s 
staff has produced well over 100 papers per year—and they have succeeded in placing some of 
their work in the preeminent outlets in life science publication, including Science, Nature, and 
Cell.   15
To measure the publication outputs of the individuals in the firm’s research department, 
we collected all articles by BTCO authors that were indexed in the ISI Web of Science. We then 
hand matched the roster of research division employees to the list of authors on papers to correct 
for spelling discrepancies. Finally, we gathered information on whether or not papers were 
coauthored with non-BTCO individuals.
3  
C. Compensation and Rewards Structure. At BTCO, scientists are eligible for three 
forms of merit compensation. First, all members of the research division receive stock option 
grants. Second, the firm dispenses end-of-year bonuses that recognize employees’ contributions 
to the company during the prior year. Over the course of the year, the department’s total research 
bonus pool increases as pre-set milestones are met. At year end, managers are given a 
customized target bonus for each of their reports, which is determined by the size of the total 
bonus pool, the individual’s salary band, and other responsibilities. After receiving a target 
bonus, managers adjust the target up or down to reflect perceived performance. Importantly, each 
laboratory is not forced into a normal curve, although BTCO’s research division as a whole 
approaches one. Finally, a distinct bonus pool is distributed to “top contributors”, who are the 
individuals judged to be in the top 5% of the performance distribution.  
We combined the latter two numbers to create a “proportion of target bonus-received” for 
each scientist, which we use to test hypothesis 1, that publication success will influence bonus 




3 In the results we will report, we considered all contributors to a paper to be equivalent, regardless of 
their position within the author list. All of our core findings are robust to limiting publication counts to 





d. Network Data. To map the network structure within and beyond the borders of 
BTCO’s research organization, the company provided us with log files containing a record of all 
emails exchanged on the company’s servers. These data were archived each day and then sent to 
us. We have taken two steps to insure the privacy of company employees. First, before 
transferring the email logs to us, BTCO’s IT staff stripped the subject headings and email content 
from all files. Second, in constructing the dataset we analyze, after matching publications to 
individual names but before we merged in compensation or email data, the company assisted us 
in replacing all names with hashed identification numbers.  
In meetings with senior leadership and rank-and-file members of BTCO, we were 
repeatedly told that BTCO is an “email place” and that a great deal of the research division’s 
business is conducted over email exchanges on the company’s servers. This assertion is 
consistent with the ebb and flow of email traffic in the data, which very much confirm our a 
priori suppositions about when communications would be most likely to occur in the company, 
and who in the organization is likely to be most active in the network. For instance, the average 
daily email volume among the members of our sample is 29-fold less on Saturdays and Sundays 
than it is on weekdays in a representative month. The average email volume of laboratory heads, 
who are akin to the leaders of small departments, is 28 percent higher than non-laboratory heads. 
These and other basic descriptive statistics closely conform to our priors about how the data 
would be distributed under the assumption than the vast majority of email interactions in the 
company are related to work, rather than purely personal interaction. 
  For all cross-sectional analyses, we used the email logs from either January or February 
2009. Before aggregating the daily emails into a sociomatrix for the month, we deleted all 
messages with more than four recipients to cull broadcast mailings (Quintane and Kleinbaum, 
2008). While this cut-point is arbitrary, the sensitivity analyses we have performed show that the 
network variables are highly correlated regardless of the cutoff, and the pattern of results holds 
across different assumptions.   17
We use the email data to construct four measures of individuals’ network positions. First, 
using a detailed organizational chart provided by the company, we are able to identify the 
immediate supervisor of all individuals in the dataset. To analyze the amount of a supervisor’s 
attention devoted to each BTCO scientist, we create a count of the number of emails that a 
supervisor k sends to a focal employee i, while controlling for supervisor k’s total sent email. We 
label this variable, “supervisor attention.”   
The email data we possess are limited to messages that reach BTCO’s servers. For 
internal communications, we have detailed information about senders and recipients, but we have 
much more limited information about individuals outside the firm who communicate with BTCO 
researchers. For all incoming messages, however, we were able to retain senders’ exact email 
addresses. This information enables us to construct, at the BTCO-researcher level, a measure of 
in-degree from scientists in universities. Specifically, we count each individual’s unique number 
of email correspondents in which the partner’s email address contains a *.edu suffix.
5 We 
assume that these emails are a residue of ties between BTCO scientists and colleagues in 
academic institutions, and that the greater the *.edu degree score for an individual in BTCO, the 
better networked he or she is likely to be in academic circles. When we present the results, we 
will report evidence which suggests that indegree from *.edu email address does indeed appear 
to capture collaborative interactions with scientists in universities. 
Lastly, we use the internal BTCO email network to construct two measures of centrality 
within the firm. First, we create a symmetrized adjacency matrix for all BTCO research 
employees. Although electronic mail links are directed ties (indeed, we differentiate between 
sender and receiver to calculate the measures of supervisor attention and *.edu indegree), the 
                                                        
5 Restricting the count to *.edu messages effectively means that we undercount the number of interactions 
between BTCO staff members and scientists in universities. This is because non-US-based universities 
and research institutes use different email suffixes. To ameliorate the undercounting, for the larger 
research institutes (e.g., the National Institutes of Health) and for major non-U.S.-universities, we have 
hand-coded senders’ email addresses to incorporate correspondents from these institutions in the *.edu 
tally.   18
vast majority of communicating pairs within the company participate in reciprocal interactions. 
Thus, for the purpose of identifying researchers’ centralities in the intra-BTCO network, we treat 
correspondences as symmetric ties. We use this matrix to calculate betweenness and eigenvector 
centrality. Our third hypothesis anticipates a positive association between publication outputs 
and these two measures of centrality within BTCO.  
    
V. Results 
  We begin our discussion of results with a set of descriptive statistics. Table 1 reports the 
recent history of publishing and patenting at BTCO. These statistics provide interesting insight 
into the scientific strategy of the firm. First, the company has published papers and filed patents 
in a ratio of approximately 2:1 favoring papers. Second, half of the scientific articles BTCO has 
published during the past seven years have been coauthored with researchers at universities. In 
turn, many of these articles have been written with collaborators who are affiliated with very 
prestigious universities in the life sciences. 
****Insert Table 1 About Here**** 
  Table 2 lists, in order of frequency, the universities with which BTCO staff have 
coauthored the greatest number of papers and with which they have exchanged the most 
electronic messages. There are two points of note in this table. First, the table underscores the 
fact that BTCO scientists have established relationships with collaborators and colleagues at 
many elite institutions in the academic life sciences. And second, while there is clearly overlap 
between the rosters of institutions where the firm has informal interactions and coauthors, there 
are differences as well. The complete list of communication partners in universities is both 
broader and different from the roster of coauthors’ affiliations. Thus, although the complete   19
coauthorship graph does inform the true information exchange network in which BTCO is 
embedded, it both under-represents and misrepresents the network’s shape, reach, and density. 
****Insert Table 2 About Here**** 
  To provide a greater sense for these data, in January 2009 a lower bound on the number 
of unique correspondents who sent electronic mail messages to members of BTCO’s research 
staff from *.edu email addresses was 1,389. As previously noted, this number excludes 
communications from individuals at many non-U.S. universities and small research institutes, so 
the actual number of correspondents in the external scientific community was considerably 
higher than this level. Moreover, when we break down the aggregate number by type of 
researcher, we find that among BTCO’s staff, publishers who hold doctorates are, by a wide 
margin, the most extensively networked to scientists at American universities. For instance, 
Ph.D. holders who have no publications in 2008 received emails from an average of 3.1 unique 
individuals at *.edu addresses in January 2009, while Ph.D.s who have one or more publications 
received messages from 8.2 distinct university addresses that month. For the 14 individuals who 
are the most prolific publishers in the firm, this number almost doubles—they engage with an 
average of 14.4 *.edu contacts.  For the 6 most prolific publishers, this number increases again to 
an average of 21.7 unique *.edu contacts. This correlation between publishing and 
communication with academic scientists strongly suggests that these correspondences reflect 
work-related interactions between BTCO researchers and colleagues in universities, rather than 
personal communications. 
  Panels A, B, and C of Table 3 present descriptive statistics for all members of BTCO’s 
research staff in the full panel (without email-based covariates) as well as for two subsets of the 
data in the 2009 cross section (with email). Panel (A) summarizes all staff members in the full 
panel. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 2009 cross section only for the members of 
the research division whose highest degree is a BA or an MA. Panel C, which is the subset of the   20
data we analyze most extensively, describes the 2009 cross section for doctoral degree holders 
only.  
Perhaps most notably, consistent with Smith-Doerr’s (2004) examination of gender issues 
in the scientific workforce in the biotechnology industry and with National Science Foundation 
data on the gender composition of recent Ph.D. cohorts in the life sciences, women actually 
makeup a slight majority—about 54%—of the scientific staff at BTCO. Panel C shows that even 
among the doctoral degree holders, women comprise 46 percent of the sample. Turning to 
publication data, Panel C shows that in 2008, approximately one third of the doctoral degrees 
holders published one or more papers, and 7.5 percent published three or more articles in that 
year. For the estimations that follow, we bin publishers into two categories, low (one or two 
papers published in the previous year) and high (greater than two papers), to allow for a flexible 
specification of the effect of publication on the outcome variables. In all regressions, the omitted 
category is zero publications. 
  Recall that researchers’ target bonus payouts are centered on 1.05 to reflect the addition 
of compensation from the “key contributors” pool. Given the range in Panel A, from 0 to 2.14, it 
is clear that managers’ perceive significant variation in their reports’ performance. Figure 1 
illustrates the overall distribution of target bonus, which is approximately normal for the research 
division. 
****Insert Figure 1 About Here**** 
  Table 4 presents the first set of regression results, which examine the effect of publication 
on researchers’ bonuses. For these regressions, no email data are required, which enables us to 
exploit the full 7-year panel that includes compensation, publication, and reporting structure 
data. In this and subsequent estimations, we analyze two different cuts of the data. In the 
columns labeled “Non-PhDs”, the data are limited to members of the research organization that 
hold bachelors and masters degrees. In the columns labeled “PhD Only”, the data are limited to   21
Ph.D. holders. If our hypotheses are correct, we expect that the findings will be much stronger 
for the subsample of doctoral degree holders. Obviously, these individuals are the primary 
drivers of the firm’s publications, and their rewards, internal, and external networks should be 
much more consequentially influenced by publication activities than would be the technicians 
and research assistants who support their work. 
****Insert Table 4 About Here**** 
  The results strongly support the first hypothesis. First, note that the effect of publications 
indeed is much stronger in the PhD sample. We report the results for both samples in Table 4; in 
the subsequent tables, however, we limit the analysis to PhD-level scientists. Across all the 
regressions, we find associations between publishing activity and the outcomes of interest for 
those with doctorate degrees, but we find weak or no associations for the BA and MA sample. 
We take this general pattern of results to be confirming evidence for the predictions; if 
measurement issues or spurious associations were driving the results, it is likely that we would 
find significant parameter estimates in the non-PhD sample as well as in the group of doctoral 
degree holders. Our confidence in the interpretations of the results we present is bolstered by the 
lack of significant correlations in the non-PhD sample. 
Columns (1-3) show the null results for publications in the sample of bachelors and 
masters degree holders. Columns (4-6) then repeat each of these regressions for the subsample of 
PhDs. In these regressions, there is evidence of a monotonic increase in the effect of publication 
on discretionary bonuses across the three levels of publication. Column (5), which includes just a 
publication/no publication indicator variable, shows that, within person, there is 6.5 point 
increase in target bonus in the years in which the focal individual has published one or more 
papers relative to years in which she has not. Column (6) incorporates the three-category 
specification of publication level, and here the coefficients suggest a monotonic increase in target 
bonus across levels of article outputs. Individuals in the low publication bin are estimated to earn   22
a 4.7 increase in target bonus relative to years in which they have no publications, while those in 
the high publication category garner a 9.4 point increase.
6  
  Table 5 columns (1-3) present the relationships between publications and the first 
measure of individuals’ positions in the communication structure within the firm, the extent to 
which an employee receives a significant amount of the outbound email volume of his or her 
immediate supervisor. In this table, the dependent variable is the number of emails that 
supervisor k sends to focal employee i. Note that because we do not have a multi-year panel of 
email data, all of the regressions in this (and subsequent tables) are estimated in a cross section—
we correlate 2008 publication records with January 2009 email network data. 
****Insert Table 5 About Here**** 
Among the control variables, there is a relatively steep, negative effect of organizational 
tenure. Presumably, the requirement for frequent interaction between supervisors and reports 
declines as common understandings and mutual expectations for a working relationship evolve 
over time. In a finding that we regard as reinforcing results on the effect of publication on target 
bonus, Columns 2-3 of Table 5 shows that not only do publishers garner greater bonus payments; 
they also monopolize a higher amount of their supervisor’s attention. Among the Ph.D.s in the 
firm, the parameter estimates suggest that, after adjusting for salary grade, gender, and tenure, 
publishers attract an additional 55% of a supervisor’s email sent volume relative to non-
publishers. In contrast to the remuneration results, however, the parameter estimates for the two 
levels of publication are roughly comparable in Table 5. Although there is no statistical 
difference between low and high publishers, the fact that publishers receive more attention from 
their supervisors is another indication of the value the firm places on scientific productivity. 
                                                        
6 When we allow both within-researcher and cross-sectional variation to inform the parameter estimates—
that is, when we exclude the person-specific fixed effects—the estimated coefficient on “high publication 
count” increases to 10.9 points.   23
To test hypothesis 2, that publishers within BTCO have a broader set of informal ties to 
the external scientific community, columns (4-6) report quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson 
estimates of the count of university indegree—a count of BTCO researchers’ number of distinct 
correspondents with *.edu email addresses. Among the control variables, we find no effect of 
gender or tenure, but unsurprisingly individuals who head labs are more likely to correspond 
with academic scientists. Column (5) in the table shows a positive and significant effect of the 
publication indicator on the *.edu degree score, and Column (6) reveals that here too, there is a 
monotonic effect across the three levels of publication counts. BTCO researchers in the high 
publication category have indegree scores from senders at universities that are estimated to be 
1.92 times the rate of non-publishers, and the corresponding estimate is 1.59 for those in the low 
(one or two article) publication category.  
  The final table examines the determinants of individual’s network centralities in the 
firm’s internal email network in January 2009. The dependent variable in Table 6, columns 1-3 is 
a scientist’s betweenness centrality in the BTCO network, and it is a researcher’s eigenvector 
centrality in columns 4-6. Given the skewed distribution of centrality scores, we again employ a 
Poisson quasi-likelihood estimator. Because the Poisson model is in the linear exponential 
family, the coefficient estimates remain consistent as long as the mean of the dependent variable 
is correctly specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984). Moreover, the PQML estimator can be used for 
any non-negative dependent variables, whether integer or continuous (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). 
****Insert Table 6 About Here**** 
For both outcome variables, the (cross sectional) results indicate that network centrality 
correlates positively with firm tenure, but at a decreasing slope. Centrality does rise in company 
tenure for the vast majority of the observed range of company tenure; betweenness centrality is 
estimated to reach a maximum in the 28
th year of tenure, while eigenvector centrality hits a   24
maximum in the 22
nd year of tenure. (In the PhD-only sample in which we estimate these 
regressions, 22 years is beyond the 98
th percentile of the tenure distribution.) Interestingly, 
ceteris paribus, men have statistically lower levels of both betweenness and eigenvector 
centrality than do women. This finding, though, is consistent with one recent study showing that 
women maintain broader and larger electronic mail networks than do men (Kleinbaum, Stuart, 
and Tushman, 2008).  
Table 6 also contains a surprising finding. Our third hypothesis forecasts a positive 
association between individuals’ publication counts and their centralities within the internal 
BTCO network. Prolific publishers can be easily singled out for the quantity and quality of their 
science. We reasoned that in a research organization with deeply ingrained scientific values and 
a belief in the power of novel science to drive the drug development pipeline, there would be a 
positive relationship between an individual’s standing in the external scientific community and 
his or her centrality in the internal company network. However, not only do we reject the 
hypothesis that the most active publishers occupy the most central positions in the firm’s 
network, we in fact observe the opposite effect—frequent publishing is negatively correlated 
with individuals’ network centrality. Relative to non-publishers, prolific publishers are estimated 
to have a 46% and a 29% decrease in their betweenness and eigenvector centrality, respectively 
(Columns 3 and 6).   
What might account for this unexpected finding? As we reconsider the possibilities, we 
are reminded of McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic (1992) ecological analysis of individuals’ 
voluntary group ties. In their analysis of the dynamics of voluntary group memberships, 
McPherson et al. find that group attachments are the shifting outcome of a few competing forces: 
the number and cohesiveness of one’s ties within a group, versus the strength of ties to members 
of different groups. These authors show that turnover in group membership depends on the 
balance of these relational forces. Viewed in this light, the association between internal BTCO 
centrality and publication counts becomes understandable. As a direct function of their   25
contributions to open Science, prolific publishers within the firm appear to strengthen and extend 
their relationships beyond it. In consequence, they are naturally drawn toward identification with 
and greater commitments within the external research community. It is possible that this increase 
in external embeddedness occur at the expense of certain activities and interactions within the 
company.  
If this supposition is correct, then this may be an additional trade-off associated with pro-
publication policies. On one hand, the evidence shows that publication activity indeed correlates 
with BTCO members’ external connectivity, as proxied by *.edu indegree. But if a drop in 
engagement in internal communication is a byproduct of the external ties gained through 
publication, this raises the specter of a search-transfer-type paradox as identified in Hansen’s 
(1999) work. Either because the act of publication itself results in time constraints that crowd out 
internal interactions that otherwise may have occurred, because publishing spawns relationships 
that draw researchers into the collaborative networks in academe and these connections crowd 
out intra-company communications, or because successful publishers value an identity that is 
more purely associated with academic science and therefore prune certain internal activities from 
their routines, prolific publishers may begin to withdraw from some internal interactions. In 
effect, those who are most able to identify promising external developments because they invest 
in developing optimal networks to search for information may, in so doing, compromise the 
within-organization networks that facilitate the internal transfer of knowledge. 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
We began this paper with the observation that innovation increasingly occurs in the 
context of diverse communities of actors, who are interconnected in a rich, if variegated, set of 
networks. In scientific fields such as biomedicine, the individuals in these networks are members 
of heterogeneous organizations, the boundaries of which often can be extremely porous.   26
Exploiting a combination of data sources including publicly available information on scientific 
publications and proprietary data on electronic mail communications and human resource 
records, this paper examines one company that has been a long-time producer of significant 
scientific advances in the life sciences. We use these data to examine the influence of scientist-
level publications on internal performance outcomes, including bonuses and the allocation of 
managerial attention, and also the effect of publication on the networks of scientists within and 
beyond the borders of the company. 
There are a few findings to highlight. First, collaboration in the form of coauthorship is a 
common means of interaction between researchers within BTCO and members of other 
organizations, including universities, research institutes, and companies. However, BTCO’s 
email server logs expose a second fact; researchers in the company maintain a much broader set 
of informal interactions with other members of its innovation ecosystem. These ties connect 
internal researcher to actors from a different and broader array of organizations, including 
domestic and foreign universities, research institutes, and other companies, than do the more 
limited coauthorship ties. Moreover, the degree centrality of researchers within BTCO in the 
network of external ties is very clearly linked to their level and quality of contributions to open 
Science via publication. In a set of unreported exploratory analyses, we further unpack this 
finding. Using data on the quality of the journals in which BTCO scientists publish, we created 
journal impact factor (JIF)-weighted publication count. We find that a strong, positive correlation 
between the quality of researchers’ publications and their *.edu indegrees. 
Although we observe a robust correlation between publishing levels and indegree 
centrality in the *.edu email network, in the cross section we cannot disentangle causality. In all 
likelihood, there is a reciprocal relationship between these two variables: connectedness to 
university-based researchers may facilitate active publishing by exposing members of BTCO’s 
scientific staff to new ideas and potential coauthors. Conversely, publishing draws attention to an 
individual’s work and establishes a researcher’s location and credentials in the exchange system   27
of science, which in turn facilitates the building of a professional network. Given the limits of the 
data available to us, we must leave the question of the balance of causality to future research. 
In addition to sorting out issues of causation, the findings we present raise a few avenues 
for subsequent research. First, if it is indeed the case that pro-publication policies at companies 
contribute to the conversion of firm-specific human capital to its general form, there are labor 
market implications of this practice. For instance, we would expect to observe the heavy use of 
retention strategies targeted at high publishers (including the adoption of internal norms for the 
allocation of discretionary compensation, as we have illustrated in this paper). In addition, it is 
likely that between-firm mobility rates will be highest for active publishers because recruiters 
outside the firm readily observe these individuals’ scientific achievements. BTCO grew rapidly 
during the period we analyze and turnover rates are too low to precisely estimate the relationship 
between publication and mobility, but we believe that this relationship is of considerable interest. 
If in fact active publishers enjoy more external job opportunities, this becomes an important 
consideration in firms’ decisions to encourage publications. 
A second avenue that merits further scrutiny is the unanticipated finding that prolific 
publishers are less central in the internal firm network. Once again, the cross sectional data and 
the lack of any exogenous sources of variation do not enable us to sort out the causal order 
between publishing and internal network position. Still, as the allied literatures on absorptive 
capacity, boundary spanning, and knowledge management all emphasize, the wiring of an 
organization’s internal network is vital to its ability to capitalize on its knowledge base, 
regardless of the split between internal development and external scouting in the creation of 
knowledge within the firm. Therefore, we believe that the unanticipated but provocative finding 
that the most prolific publishers have somewhat more peripheral positions in the internal network 
than would otherwise be the case warrants closer inspection. If this finding is replicable, it may 
imply an additional trade-off in the decision to adopt an open publication strategy, as external 
connectivity comes at the expense of the internal networks that are required to capitalize on it.   28
Moreover, this result also raises the question of what management strategies and incentive 
systems might be created to ameliorate any trade-off between the creation and maintenance of 
networks that are optimal for external search for knowledge versus those that facilitate internal 
transfer. 
Finally, although it is beyond the scope of this analysis, the result on the association 
between publications and internal centrality raises interesting questions about who communicates 
with whom inside the firm? Do interactions within the research organization tend to sort within 
strata of publishing levels (i.e., are prolific publishers prone to interact with one another, forming 
cliques in the communication structure)? Exactly how does the maintenance of external relations 
alter the network structure inside the firm? For instance, if productive publishers reconfigure 
their intra-firm networks, are they more likely to curtail cross-laboratory interactions than those 
within their units of the organization? As datasets such as the one we have collected for this 
project become available, it will become possible to answer these and related questions. As well, 
we will gain further insight into the nature, consequences, and permeability of organizational 




Table 1: Descriptive Stats on Yearly Publishing (limited to individuals who 
appear in this dataset)  












2001 83*  210  108  45  32  5 
2002 76*  156  69  24  22  4 
2003 77  150  74  27  27  6 
2004 63  164  82  26  25  12 
2005 77  149  78  25  29  5 
2006 92  136  60  25  27  9 
2007 26**  161  89  36  27  10 
*human genome patents were excluded from this count.   
**incomplete data collection.  






Table 2: Prevalent Institutions of Coauthors and Correspondents  
Rank Order  Coauthored 
Universities 
Count  Email Correspondence in 
January, 2009 
Count 
1 UCSF  102  UCSF  753 
2 Stanford  79  Stanford  553 
3 Harvard  71  Salk  Institute  123 
4 UCLA  48  UCDavis  117 
5 Duke  34  UCBerkeley  98 
6 Yale  32  Yale  82 
7  UColorado-Denver 31  U. of Iowa  74 
8 UWashington  30  Harvard  64 
9  UPenn  24  U. of Chicago  58 
10 NIH  22  UCLA  49   30
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Pooled Cross-Section Descriptive Statistics (n = scientist-years = 
1964) 
 Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Age 39.210  8.704  22  69 
Male 0.462  0.499  0  1 
Highest Education-BA  0.368  0.482  0  1 
Highest Education-MA  0.233  0.423  0  1 
Highest Education-PhD  0.399  0.490  0  1 
Firm Tenure  5.964  6.543  0  30 
Lab Head  0.240  0.427  0  1 
No Publications  0.768  0.422  0  1 
Low Publications  0.136  0.343  0  1 
High Publication  0.096  0.295  0  1 
Patents 4.561  69.216  0  1670 
% of Target Bonus Received  1.058  0.254  0  2.47 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for non-PhDs: Year 2008 (n = 198).   
 Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Age 39.480  9.524  24  70 
Male 0.394  0.490  0  1 
Highest Education-BA  0.601  0.491  0  1 
Highest Education-MA  0.399  0.491  0  1 
Firm Tenure  7.722  7.052  1  31 
Lab Head  0.045  0.209  0  1 
No Publications  0.763  0.427  0  1 
Low Publications  0.222  0.417  0  1 
High Publications  0.015  0.122  0  1 
Supervisor Attention*  11.497  13.409  0  65 
*.EDU Indegree  2.273  2.603  0  13 
Betweenness  Centrality 0.082  0.131 0 1.010 
Eigenvector  Centrality  0.814  0.762 0 5.638 
% of Target Bonus Received**  0.997  0.203  0  1.667 
*N = 197. 
**N = 194; for 2008 performance. 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for BTCO research employees without PhDs. All publication measures are 
for 2008 authorships. Low publications is an indicator for 1 or 2 publications. High Publications is an 
indicator for 3 or more publications. All email network variables are generated using 2009 data. The 
supervisor attention variable does not apply to the full dataset because some supervisors have departed the 
dataset. The % of Target Bonus Received dataset is smaller due to the presence of recent hires.     31
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for PhDs: Year 2008 (n = 191).   
 Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Age 40.251  7.059  27  64 
Male 0.545  0.499  0  1 
Firm Tenure  5.466  5.416  1  29 
Lab Head  0.346  0.477  0  1 
No Publications  0.675  0.469  0  1 
Low Publications  0.251  0.435  0  1 
High Publications  0.073  0.261  0  1 
Supervisor Attention*  10.972  13.855  0  139 
*.EDU Indegree  4.539  6.807  0  59 
Betweenness Centrality  0.227  0.361  0  3.059 
Eigenvector Centrality  1.921  2.129  0  11.763 
% of Target Bonus Received**  1.139  0.282  0.6  2.143 
*N = 178. 
**N = 150; for 2008 performance. 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for BTCO research employees with PhDs. All publication measures are for 
2008 authorships. Low publications is an indicator for 1 or 2 publications. High Publications is an 
indicator for 3 or more publications. All email network variables are generated using 2009 data. The 
supervisor attention variable does not apply to the full dataset because some supervisors have departed the 
dataset. The % of Target Bonus Received dataset is smaller due to the presence of recent hires.  32
Table 4: Fixed Effects (Panel) Linear Model on Share of Discretionary Bonus 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dataset  Non-PhDs Non-PhDs Non-PhDs  PhDs  PhDs  PhDs 
Is an author   -0.0011     0.0650**   
 (0.0146)    (0.0218)  
Low Pubcount     0.0073     0.0467+ 
   (0.0157)     (0.0249) 
High Pubcount     -0.0310     0.0942** 
   (0.0251)     (0.0290) 
Patent Count  0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013**  0.0002*  0.0002*  0.0002* 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  0.0058 0.0058 0.0055  0.0310**  0.0291**  0.0286** 
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) 
Tenure-squared  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant  1.0479** 1.0483** 1.0479** 0.9073** 0.8756** 0..0767** 
(0.0755) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0764) (0.0766) (0.0767) 
R-squared  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.11 
rho  1 1 1 1 1 1 
F-test  3 3 3 6 6 6 
Observations 1181 1181 1181  782  782  782 
#  of  employees  334 334 334 209 209 209 
Note: Estimates are displayed as raw coefficients. All publication variables (Is an author, Low Pubcount, 
and High Pubcount) are binary (i.e., 0/1) indicators. All models include unreported salary-band and year 
dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses below; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Impact of Publishing on Supervisor Attention and University 
Indegree- (QML-Poisson)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dataset  PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs 












Is an author   0.436**     0.511   
 (0.119)     (0.200)*   
Low Pubcount     0.432**     0.467* 
   (0.126)     (0.220) 
High Pubcount     0.494*    0.656* 
   (0.248)     (0.315) 
Sup. Outvolume  0.605** 0.578** 0.576**       
(0.125) (0.122) (0.123)       
Male  -0.140 -0.098 -0.098 0.013  0.055  0.063 
(0.176) (0.159) (0.159) (0.166) (0.150) (0.152) 
Laboratory Head  -0.244 0.120 0.124  0.948**  0.821**  0.839** 
(0.710) (0.652) (0.647) (0.268) (0.289) (0.293) 
Tenure  -0.086* -0.130**  -0.131** 0.081+  0.029  0.029 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.044) (0.047) (0.055) (0.054) 
Tenure-squared  0.003+ 0.005** 0.005* -0.003+ -0.001  -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Laboratory size  -0.014 -0.027 -0.026 0.036  0.026  0.025 
(0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) 
Constant  -0.302 -0.133 -0.120 0.049  0.052  0.049 
(1.108) (1.106) (1.117) (0.556) (0.581) (0.579) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -907  -877 -877 -548 -532 -530 
Observations  178 178 178 191 191 191 
# of lab clusters  71  71  71  76  76  76 
Note: Estimates are displayed as raw coefficients. The supervisor attention dependent variable is the 
number of messages received from the supervisor. All models include unreported salary-band dummies 
and division dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered by laboratory, in parentheses below; + 
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   34
Table 6: Impact of Publishing on Betweenness and Eigenvector Centrality- (QML-Poisson) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dataset  PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs 
Dep. Var.   Betweenness Betweenness Betweenness Eigenvector Eigenvector Eigenvector 
Is an author   0.193    0.004  
 (0.164)    (0.132)  
Low Pubcount     0.354*     0.091 
   (0.161)     (0.142) 
High Pubcount     -0.614*     -0.340+ 
   (0.258)     (0.185) 
Male  -0.405* -0.382*  -0.399**  -0.243+ -0.243+ -0.253* 
(0.178) (0.173) (0.147) (0.129) (0.129) (0.117) 
Laboratory Head  0.503 0.436 0.418 0.431 0.430 0.415 
(0.314) (0.313) (0.296) (0.272) (0.265) (0.263) 
Tenure  0.175** 0.160** 0.168**  0.068+  0.068+  0.070* 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.047) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Tenure-squared  -0.007** -0.006** -0.006**  -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.003* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Laboratory size  -0.029 -0.034 -0.031 0.004  0.004  0.005 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Constant  -0.905+ -0.859+ -0.933*  0.837*  0.838*  0.824* 
(0.466) (0.496) (0.454) (0.423) (0.425) (0.403) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -83  -83  -82  -277  -277  -274 
Observations  191 191 191 191 191 191 
# of lab clusters  76  76  76  76  76  76 
Note: Estimates are displayed as raw coefficients. All models include unreported salary-band dummies and division dummies. Robust standard 
errors, clustered by laboratory, in parentheses below; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
 
 
Figure 1: Share of Discretionary Bonus 
 
Note: Managers are provided a customized target bonus for each of their direct reports. This 
target is then adjusted to reflect performance. We present received/target bonus to reflect a 
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